This paper presents a logical system in which various group-level epistemic actions are incorporated into the object language. That is, we consider the standard modeling of knowledge among a set of agents by multi-modal Kripke structures. One might want to consider actions that take place, such as announcements to groups privately, announcements with suspicious outsiders, etc. In our system, such actions correspond to additional modalities in the object language. That is, we do not add machinery on top of models (as in Fagin et al [1], but we reify aspects of the machinery in the logical language.
Introduction
One of the interesting developments in epistemic logic in recent years is the importation of ideas from dynamic logic. This development promises to enrich our formal accounts of knowledge by incorporating knowledge change and actions leading to knowledge change into existing frameworks. This paper continues the work on epistemic logics with group updates initiated in Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [3] . The idea is to meld the approaches of multi-agent epistemic logic as appears in Fagin et al [1] ) with the work of Veltman [5] on update semantics. Veltman's goal is to give a "dynamic" account of meaning which replaces truth-conditional semantics by notions having to do with changes of information state.
An example of an announcement
To see what the subject is about, consider the case of a set .,4 of three agents, say A, B, and C; two atomic propositions, p and q, and a Kripke model with four worlds w, x, y, and z depicted below. We have written out the accessibility relations In other notation, we have w "-~A w, w ----~A x, x -' ---~C z, W ~ p, etc. We have some standard semantic facts, such as w ~ ~DBp (in w, B does not know p, since p is false in y), and w ~ DA-~OBp , etc. Now suppose someone comes to each world v E W where p holds, takes A and B off to the side, and tells them (together) that indeed, p holds there. We want to update the worlds so that A and B's accessibility relations only include worlds where p is true. On the other hand, C was excluded from the announcement (and in fact at this point, we want to assume that C did not even know about it.) So C's accessibility relation should not change. We want to represent the updated version v' in a way that captures the epistemic alternatives available to each of the agents. Our proposal is that the worlds below represent the updated versions of the corresponding worlds above. Note first that in the updated worlds, we have kept C's accessibility relations the way they were, since C was not party to the communication. Further, consider the update of w, and focus on the worlds accessible to B. Before the update, B used to think that w, y, and z were possible. It should be clear why there is no trace of y in the worlds accessible to B after the update of w. So we need to update w to some new world; this is why w r is needed. And w r should have the same propositional content, since announcements do not change facts. The main question might be: why in w ~ do A's accessibility relations point to w ~ and x ~ (and not w and x)? And why do B's point to w r and z p (and not w and z)? The reason is that announcing p to A and B should mean that not only do A and B think ~p is impossible, but also that ~p should be impossible from all the worlds they think possible, etc. This leads to a fixedpoint semantics for updates via actions. It generalizes the "conscious" updates of [3, 2] to arbitrary Kripke models. (The presentationof [3, 2] uses non-wellfounded sets; these are essentially model-world pairs modulo bisimulation.)
The main justification for our proposal on how to model actions comes from looking at semantic facts that hold in the updated worlds. For example, (W', w' / ~ DiA,B}p. That is, in W ~ at the world in w r, it is common knowledge among A and B that p holds. (We use the standard modeling of common knowledge via infinite iteration. See, e.g., Fagin et al [1] for this.) On the other hand, one can check that the updates do not change any knowledge facts for C: for all v • W, (W, v) ~ Dc~ p iff (W', v') ~ Dc~. Both of these consequences seem right.
Suspicion Recall that we introduced the announcement to A and B by saying that someone takes them off and announces a fact. Our modeling of this has a feature that might not be appropriate in a lot of applications: C was not only excluded from the announcement, but after the announcement C has the mistaken view that nothing whatsoever happened. It was as if the announcement were completely private. This is a very strong assumption to make, and one might well want to model situations where C knows that some announcement is made, or (as in our example) that C suspects that p was announced to A and B, or that C listens in to the announcement while A and B are unaware of this, etc. We'll see how these effects can be modeled in Examples 3.3-3.5 below.
Contents of this paper
What we want to do in this paper is to study two logical systems (over L([~] )) is a finite Kripke frame K over the set .,4 of agents, together with a map PRE : K --+ E. (PRE stands for "precondition," and we discuss this below when we turn to the semantics.) We call the worlds of K action tokens. An action is a pair oL = (K, k) consisting of an action structure K and some k • K. We usually suppress K and k in our notation and use o~ instead. For example, we write PRE(O~) instead of PRE(k). Each action o~ thus is just like a finite model-world pair with an additional function PRE.
The actions constitute a Kripke frame Actions in the natural way, by setting (
This completes the definitions of £([a]) and of the classes of actions (and action structures) over
Semantics
The ideas There are a few leading ideas behind the semantics. First, our action structures are Kripke frames. We therefore think of the actions in the same way that we think of frames. That is, our actions are viewed differently by different agents. So to say that k "-~A l means, intuitively, that if k is the action token that really happens, then A thinks it is possible that l happens. The actions themselves are pointed frames, so they come with an additional piece of information, namely a fixed action token which really does take place. Second, we'll approach the semantics of (W,w) ~ Third, as the example in Section 1 suggests, the effect of an action a on (W, w) is to introduce copies of parts of W. We say that a world w survives k E K if (W,w) ~ PRE(k). That is, we think of PRE(k) as the pressuposition or precondition necessary for k to happen. We want preconditions because some epistemic actions cannot intuitively happen in some worlds. The easiest example is in S5-models with truthful announcements: a person cannot get a truthful announcement that cp unless ~p really is true in the actual world. We introduce (formal) copies (w, a), whenever w survives a. This copy (w, a) is supposed to represent the effect of the action a on (W, w). We want to make these copies into a Kripke model. All of our work rests on the assumption that our actions do not change facts, so the atomic propositions true at (w, a) are going to be the same as those true at w in W. The accessibility relations are harder. The idea is that we want to have a fixed-point characterization:
(W, w) a --~A (W, x) z iff w '-~A X in W, and a ----~A /3.
To get a feeling for this, think in the $5 case, where ----~A is an equivalence relation of indistinguishability. If A cannot distinguish between (W, w) and (W, x) and also cannot distinguish between actions a and/3, then A should not be able to distinguish (W, w) ~ and (W, x) z. So the thrust of the formal definition is to show how to solve this fixed-point characterization explicitly.
The details As with the syntax, we define two things simultaneously: the semantic relation (W, w) ~ cp, and a partial operation ((W, w), a) ~ (W, w) ~.
Given a model W and an action structure K, we define the model W g as follows:
1. The worlds of W g are the pairs (w, k) E W × K such that (W, w) ~ PRE(k).
2. For such pairs, (w, k) "-'~A (W', k I) iff w "-'~W w' and k "-'~A kt-
We interpret the atomic propositions by setting VwK((W , k)) = vw(w).
That is, p is true at (w,k) in W K iffp is true at w in W.
Given an action a = (K, k) and a model-world pair (W, w), we say that (W, w) a is defined if[ (W,w) ~ PRE(k), and in that case we set
The semantics of our language is given by extending the usual clauses for modal logic by one for actions:
As is customary, we abbreviate ~[a]~qo by (a)~. Then we have (W, w) ~ (a)qo iff (W, w) a is defined and (W, w) a ~ ~p.
The larger language L([a], O*) We also consider a larger language E([o~], D*). This is defined by adding operators D~ for all subsets 13 C ,4. {When we do this, of course we get more actions as well.) The semantics works exactly as in PDL.
Logics determined by sets of actions Throughout this paper, we restrict attention to /:([a]) and/:([o~], [3*) as we have defined them. However, if one is only interested in a special class C of actions, then it makes sense to consider the logics restricted to C. For E([a]), this would not change things very much. For L([a], [3"), on the other hand, the restriction can give simpler logical systems. We will not explore any of these issues in this paper. Example 3.2 Secure group-announcements a la Gerbrandy-Groeneveld. Let ..4 = {A, B, C}, and suppose that the group /3 = {A, B} gets together and announces qo publicly. We model this using a two-world frame K = {k, l} with k ----4 A k, k -"+B k, k "-'~C l, and l -+D l for all D E `4. We set PRE(k) = (p and PRE(I) ----true. Let a = (K, k) and j3 = (K, l). If ~ is atomic, then (W, w) ~ [a]Obqo. That is, the announcement of qo created common knowledge. However if qo is a sentence like ~p, then we might well have (W, w) ~ qo A-~[a]qo. This is a desirable feature of any semantics for the updating of information: an announcement of a negative fact does not in general create knowledge of that fact. In any case, we also have a modeling that C does not know, or even suspect, that the announcement happened. That is, ~ Ocqo ~ [a]Oc(p. Moreover, A and B know this. There is no way to say this explicitly in our language (because our language cannot refer directly to actions themselves), but we do have the following:
Examples

DA[:]C~O ~ [a]DAOC~
and also ~ O~D099 ~ D~Ocqo. In order to model suspicion, we would add the arrow k -+c k to K. Call the resulting actions c~ r and j3 ~. Then if cp is atomic (so that an announcement of ~ results in the knowledge t:hat cp holds), and if {W, w) ~ ~CDA~, then
Note that this action structure is an $5 structure, and so are W a' and W ft. This is important because in many situation we want to restrict attention to models and actions which are $5.
Example 3.4 Group announcements with a secure wiretap. In the last example, C was not aware that A and B got the announcement ~, and indeed A and B knew this. We'll modify this example to allow C to listen in and learn that ~ was announced. In this example, C will not learn (p, and also A and B will be unaware that they are being wiretapped. (For this reason, it is best to think of D here as referring to belief rather than knowledge.)
We again use K with three worlds, say k, l, and m. The worlds k and l are exactly as in Example 3.2. We put m --4"A k, m ---~B k, and m --~c m; also PRE(m) ----{ft. Let k, l, and m determine actions c~, fl, and % respectively. Then 7 is the wiretapped action, for the following reasons: For all ¢,
That is, after A's beliefs about C;s beliefs are not affected by 7. On the other hand, if ~ is an atomic proposition such that (W, w) ~ ~p A ~OdCp, then That is, after 7, C believes that ~p is common knowledge for A and B, but C was not aware of this before. It can also be checked that A and B will not know that C learned anything by 7, as in Example 3.2.
Example 3.5 Announcements with suspicion of a wiretap. In the action 7 of Example 3.4, A and B did not suspect that they were wiretapped. We can model an action where A and B do suspect, but not know for sure, that they are wiretapped (which in fact they are). For this, we just add two more arrows m -~'A m and m ~S m to the action structure K of Example 3.4. Then the action 7 ~ determined by m in this new structure models the announcement with suspicion of a wiretap. Indeed, action 7 r is exactly like 7 (in the previous example) with respect to wiretapping: C does listen in and learns that cp was announced. But now A and B are conscious of this possibility: they consider as a possible action the very action 7 ~ that takes place. In other words, they suspect they are being wiretapped.
In this action, we assumed C knows that A and B suspect but not know about a wiretap. Of course, one could model other possibilities, by appropriately changing the action . Example 3.6 Message-passing. It is possible to represent the information content of messagepassing on (possibly faulty, or wiretapped) channels. This is not a special case of an announcement with suspicion, since the sender and receiver might disagree as to the security of the channel.
Many other types of examples are possible. We can represent misleading epistemic actions, e.g. lying, or more generally acting such that some people do not suspect that your action is possible. We can also represent gratuitous suspicion ("paranoia"): maybe no "real" action has taken place, except that some people start suspecting some action (e.g., some private comunication) has taken place. We are also not restricted to S5-type actions: we can model a situation where an agent comes to believe that ~o, without believing that he believes ~p.
The Logic for/:([a])
In this section we present a sound and complete logic for £([a]). Here is the key axiom:
Proposition 4.1 The following Action Axiom is sound: (PRE( ) :
Z}).
The completeness result for /:([a]) is based on a translation of £([a]) to ordinary modal logic/2. And this translation is based on the following term rewriting system ~:
[oL]p ~ PRE(O~) ~ p
PRE( )
In all of our work on term rewriting, we want to consider £([a]) as a two-sorted set, consisting of sentences and actions. We regard sentences as terms in the usual way. Actions can be regarded as terms, too: Let K be a Kripke frame K with n worlds, and let there be m agents in .,4. Then K can be regarded as an n × m-ary function symbol fK, using the PRE functions in the natural way. Given n × m sentences ~, fK (~) is an action. The point of all of this is to allow rewriting to go on inside of actions.
Proposition 4.2 There is a wellfounded relation < on the sentences of/:([a]) and the actions over £([a]) such that for all rules cp ~ ¢ of ~, then ¢ < ~. Moreover, if a --+* 13, then >
This takes some work, and because of space limitations we must omit the entire discussion except to say that we use the lexicographic path order, first studied by Kamin and Levy, and by Dershowitz. At this point, we want to use the rewrite system 7¢ above, applying the rules at arbitrary points inside of sentences. 
Lemma 4.3 A sentence ~ E/:([a]) is a normal form iff it is a modal sentence (that is, iff ~p contains no actions). A sentence ~ E E([a], D*) is a normal form iff it is built from atomic propositions using -~, A, ~A, D~, or if it is of the form [a]Db~b, where a is an action in normal form, and ¢, too, is in normal form. An action a is a normal form action if each PRE(~) is a normal form sentence for all fl such that o~ -+* ft.
In the next result, we let L be ordinary modal logic over AtProp (where of course there are no actions), and £c¢ is the infinitary version of modal logic, where we have conjunctions of arbitrary sets of sentences.
Proposition 4.4 Concerning our languages ~, E([o~]), £([a], O*), and L~: 1. There is a translation t : L([a]) -+ £ such that every sentence cp E L([oL]) is semantically
equivalent to ~t E L.
The map t extends to a map from L([o~]
, O*) to L~. In fact, each ~pt may be taken to be a recursive sentence of ordinal height < w ~.
A Completeness Result for L([o~])
Based on our translations above, we can get a short completeness result for £ ([a] ). First, we consider a logical system whose axioms are any complete set of axioms of the modal logic K together with more axioms corresponding to the rewriting system, and with necessitation for D and for actions [a] . The axioms and rules are listed in the box in Figure 3 . (But we only use the axioms and rules which do not contain the • or o symbols. The remaining material is used for the larger language/:([a], D*).)
Proposition 4.5 This logical system for £([a]) is strongly complete: E F cfl iff E ~ cfl.
The first strong completeness result of this kind is due to Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [3] . Actually, they only worked with the language determined by the actions of Example 3.2 rather than the full L([o~]). Their proof did not use translation to modal logic, but instead studied the strongly extensional quotient of the canonical model of (multi-agent) K.
D*)
£([a], Q*) is More Expressive than Modal Logic with D* In contrast to our translations results for £([a]), the larger language L([a], D*) cannot be translated into £ or even to £(D*) (modal logic with extra modalities []~). So completeness results for £([a], D*) cannot simply be based on translations the way we saw for £([o~]).
In the result below, we assume that the set .,4 is a singleton, and so we omit it from the notation. We use an action a defined as follows. There is one point, say k, and k ~ k. Also, we take PRE(k) to be some atomic proposition p. We also let q be some atomic proposition distinct from p.
Theorem 5.1 The sentence (oL)O*q of£([o~], D*) cannot be expressed by any sentence orE(D*). In fact, (o~)O* q cannot be expressed by any set of sentences of £(D*).
The proof uses an adaptation of Ehrenfeucht games on specific finite models.
At this point, we turn to the completeness result for L([a], 0*). It is easy to check that there is no hope of getting a strong completeness result (where one has arbitrary sets of hypotheses).
The best one can hope for is a system where t-~ if and only if ~ ~p. We achieve this with a logical system which is listed in Figure 3 below. The key semantic result is a reduction of the truth in some model W of sentences of the form (c~)~ to the existence of certain paths in W.
Proposition 5.2 (W, w) ~ (o~)<>~ iff there is a sequence of worlds from W
where k _> O, and also a sequence of actions of the same length k, This result underlies the soundness of the main rule of our logical system, Action Rule. We restate it below.
The Action Rule Let ¢ be sentence, and let C be a set of agents. Consider sentences Xf~ for all/~ such that c~ ~/3 (including c~ itself). Assume that: Remark Recall that there are only finitely many/~ such that o~ ---+~/3, since each is determined by a world of the same Kripke frame that determines v~. So even though the Action Rule might look like it takes infinitely many premises, it really only takes finitely many.
Another point: if one so desires, both the Action Rule and the Induction Rule could be replaced by (more complicated) axiom schemas. Definition Let cr = (K, k} and f~ = {L, l) be actions. Then the action composition ~ o ~ is the action defined as follows. Consider the product set K x L. We turn this into a Kripke frame using the restriction of the product arrows. We get an action structure by setting
Finally, we set (~ o/~ = (K x L, (k, 1)). The remaining rule of the system is necessitation for D~ modalities, and the soundness of this rule is trivial. This completes the discussion of the axioms and rules of our logical system.
Basic Axioms
Remark
It Definition Let a and a t be actions. We write ~-a ~ a t if a and a t are based on the same Kripke frame W and the same world w, and if for all v C W, ~ PaE(v) ~ PREt(v), where PRE is the announcement function for a, and PRE I for a t.
We note the following bisimulation-like properties:
1. If t-a ~ a', then also ~ PRE(O 0 ~ PRE(at).
2. Whenever f~t is such that a t * * -+c fit, then there is some/~ such that t-fl ~ f~ and a ---~c flThese follow easily from the way we defined PRE on actions in terms of functions on frames. The proof is based on the filtration argument for completeness of PDL due to Kozen and Parikh [4] . We show that every consistent cp has a finite model, and that the size of the model is recursive in ~p.
We shall need to use some results concerning the rewriting system 7~ which we introduced in Section 4. In particular, recall that we have a wellfounded relation < on £( 
For ~o not in normal form, let f(~o) = f(nf(~o)). We now define a filtration to be called .T. The worlds of .T will be the equivalence classes [U] under -=, where U is a maximal consistent set in the logic. We set the atomic propositions true at [U] to be AtProp N U. Furthermore, we also set where k > 0 such that each Ai E C, and for which there exists a sequence of actions length k, 
Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper, we have continued the program begun in Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [3] and Gerbrandy [2] of adding epistemic update operators to modal logic. We believe that the following are our main contributions:
1. We formulated a logical system with new modalities corresponding to intuitive grouplevel epistemic actions. These actions include natural formalizations of announcements to groups with, and without, suspicion by outsiders.
2. The original semantics from [3] and [2] used non-wellfounded sets. Our semantics works with arbitrary Kripke models. The advantages of doing this are that the logic can be used by those who do not know about non-wellfounded sets, and also that completeness results are slightly stronger with a more general semantics.
3. Without infinitary operations, the logic may be translated into standard modal logic. Therefore, we obtained a completeness proof for this fragment, just by adding to standard modal logic whatever axioms are needed to do the translation.
4. But adding concepts common knowledge leads to a much more expressive language.
The validities of £([c~]
, D*) can be axiomatized along the lines of propositional dynamic logic. As a result, we get the finite model property and hence decidability.
There are a number of questions which we are pursuing at this time. The relation between communications and our actions needs to be investigated. It would be interesting to prove that certain natural actions cannot be expressed in our framework, and then to expand it to encompass them. We are investigating a more "dynamic" versions of the logic, in which carrying out an action is one sort of program, and in addition in which the Kleene star operation on programs adds further power. We have studied the expressive power of various fragments when the actions are secure public announcements. We would like to get a completeness theorem for this kind of dynamic logic. We want to investigate completeness for certain natural classes of actions and models, such as when all are $4 or $5. This would be useful for getting logics of what might be called "knowledge actions" (what we have are closer to doxastic actions). We would like to investigate whether our languages and logics can help in formalizing and studying the knowledge programs of Fagin et al [1] . We think it would be interesting to take other notions of common knowledge, ones which do not reduce the notion to iterated knowledge, and carry out the same kind of investigations that we have done in this paper. Finally, note that all of our actions presuppose truth in a certain sense: the precondition functions PRE must be satisfied for a world to be updated. This assumption fails in many applications, and we think it would be useful to think about incorporating ideas from belief revision into our framework.
